One citizen or resident of France out of five has Islamic and/or third world roots. No political party or leader in France can ignore it any more. Not even Sarkozy.
For about fifty years, from the Charles de Gaulle presidency (1959-1969) to the Jacques Chirac one (1995-2007), France’s policies in the Middle East were shaped primarily by nationalistic « grand strategic » factors : hostility towards American hegemony, the lure for cheap oil and then for oil-related trade and investment, and a fascination for a French-Arab or Euro-Islamic alliance. On all three accounts, Israel was seen as a nuisance, if not an enemy.
The nationalist paradigm was partially relaxed under François Mitterrand (1981-1995), who was interested, for various reasons and at least to a point, in smoother relations with both the United States and Israel. A second relaxation occured in Chirac’s final years (2004-2007). The Iraq War, that Chirac had fiercely opposed, had destroyed or weakened several of France’s associates or former associates in the area : Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, but also the Assad dynasty’s Syria and Muammar Kadhafi’s Libya. It was safer, accordingly, to adapt to the new American-dominated situation. In addition, Ariel Sharon’s about-face on the Palestinian question allowed for a quick reconciliation with Israel without any « loss of face » on the part of France.
In 2007, nationalism seemed to be gone for good, as Nicolas Sarkozy, a supporter of Nato, a friend of America and an open admirer of Israel, was elected president. Two years later, however, France is clearly relapsing into its former pro-Arab and pro-Islamic options. Not for grand strategy reasons any more, but out of sheer domestic concerns : France, once a Western, White country with a Christian background, is morphing into a multicultural, multiethnic and multireligious nation, with a strong Islamic element.
Like most other Western countries, and in spite of its nationalistic posturing, France has ingathered large numbers of alien immigrants for decades, mostly from the third world : either citizens of the former colonies in North Africa, Subsaharan Africa, the Levant, the Indian Ocean, the Far East, or citizens of other Middle Eastern or tropical countries, or even « cultural aliens », i. e. French citizens from overseas territories in the West Indies, the Indian Ocean and Oceania, who settled, or were induced to settle, in France proper. In the long run, it has led to a dramatic demographic and societal transformation.
Under French law, no census may be taken on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion or national origin. Even academic investigation is somehow restricted regarding these matters. Still, it is widely estimated that : (a) about 10 million residents of metropolitan France, out of a total number of 63 million, i. e. one resident out of six, have third world roots ; (b) if one is to include the overseas territories, which are technically part of the same country under French law and international law, one should rather say that 13 millions residents out of 66 millions, i. e. one resident out of 5, have third world roots ; (c) the immigrant or overseas communities are much younger and more prolific than the metropolitan communities : when it comes to the younger brackets of the global French population, they amount to 30 % of the total population at least, and in some cases, to 50 %.
Quite naturally, the Neo-French (« les Français issus de la diversité », as they are currently refered to – something to be loosely translated as « the more diverse Frenchmen ») tend to exert as much leverage as they can on French politics, in direct proportion to their numbers, or more accurately to the numbers, among them, of French citizens and – since every child born on French soil is entittled to citizenship – of youngsters that reach the age of 18. Until the 1990’s, their constituency was still modest : many of them were still unfranchised or too young to vote. Today, as many alien residents have been naturalized, and as their children are coming of age, it is becoming a key constituency in many ballots, either national, local or European. And it is expected to grow even more impressively in the two coming decades. In addition, Neo-French leverage may include less democratic ways and means, like mass demonstrations, street violence, riots, or terrorism.
As a result, every political party is now attempting to coopt the Neo-French or at least not to antagonize them.
Ever since Mitterrand, the Socialist Party (PS) and the other Leftwing groups have championed immigrant and non-White communities : they currently garner about two thirds of their global vote, and about 80 % of the Muslim vote alone. Jean-Marie Le Pen’s National Front, a fascist party that once campaigned against Islam and non-White immigration, has changed its tune in the 2000’s, and won many Neo-French supporters.
Among the conservatives, Chirac had always been eager to play the Neo-French and Muslim cards. Sarkozy, who owed his election in 2007, in no small measure, to a strong stand on « national identity », and against mass immigration, was the first president ever to support affirmative action – a concept hitherto shunned as a breach from the French Republican idea of equality – as a government policy, and to rise Neo-French figures, like Rachida Dati, the Moroccan-born minister of Justice, Rama Yade, the Senegalese-born minister for Human Rights, or Fadela Amara, the Algerian-born minister for Urban Policy, to full-flegded cabinet position.
Moreover, concern for the Neo-French vote may be the ultimate rationale behind one of Sarkozy’s most striking, and less understood, initiatives in international affairs : the Union for the Mediterranean (UFM), which is supposed to federate the European Union and every single country or entity in Northern Africa and the Near East.
Now, the sad fact is that the Neo-French are globally anti-Israel. Not all of them, admittedly, bust most of them. Muslims – who amount to two thirds of them – are anti-Israel, and by implication anti-Jewish and anti-Western, just because they are Muslims. Non-Muslims tend frequently to side with Muslims, Arabs or Palestinians, because they feel close to them as former colonial subjects or third-worlders. What we have here is the common scourge of Islamic cultures and many non-European cultures as well : ochlocracy, the supremacy of group conformity over individual opinion.
The Gaza War started in between Christmas and New Year, a period known in France as la trêve des confiseurs (« the confectionners’ truce »), where politics and the media are supposed to come to a stillstand. It did not prevent the Islamic militants to engage overnight in sermons, internet buzz and rallies on behalf of the Hamas regime, so effectively that anti-Jewish violence flared up throughout the country. In Toulouse, Southern France, Muslim extremists set a car aflame and launched it against a synagogue. In Metz, Lorraine, Muslim mobsters marched from the mosque, where they had listened to an anti-Jewish sermon, to the local synagogue, apparently in order to vandalize it. The pogrom was luckily averted by the local police. Several Jewish rallies had to called off, including in Paris, for fear of violence. A well known TV icon, Arthur, had to cancell his show in several cities, because of threats. In Strasbourg, Alsace, a city councillor was subjected to similar bullying. All in all, 352 antisemitic acts, including 50 violent acts, were to be reported during the month of January : five times more than the monthly average during the previous years.
When the « confectioners’ truce » was over, Islamic protest evolved into a broader « human rights protest » against what was now described as « slaughter in Gaza » , if not as « genocide ». Large scale demonstrations – with tens of thousands of participants – were staged in every major city. Most participants were Muslims or Neo-French. Many women, among them, were veiled. Arab and Muslim flags were flawn. All kinds of anti-Israeli or anti-Jewish slogans were shouted, including « Death to Jews ». And again, violence erupted. In Paris, cars were burned and windows were smashed along a pro-Hamas demonstration on Boulevard Malesherbes.
It comes as no surprise, then, that the government, the political class and most of the media have either aligned with the Neo-French with regard to the Gaza crisis, or acted with a too ostensible even-handedness.
Most of the Left sheepishly condoned the pro-Hamas frenzy. On January 6, the Political Bureau of the Socialist Party denounced Israel’s military operations as « excessive » and « illegitimate in terms of international law. » On January 10, Martine Aubry, the new leader of the party, said Israel’s behaviour was « scandalous » and « unlikely to be supported by any peace-loving democrat in the world ». In many instances, Socialist mayors or members of Parliament took part in the street demonstrations : Aubry herself did it as mayor of Lille, the capital of France’s industrial North (which happens to be today, together with its suburbs, the largest Islamic city in the country). The Far Left (the communists, trotskyites, antiglobalists and environmentalists) was even more extreme in its support of Hamas and vilification of Israel.
Some Socialist leaders were more cautious, however. Bertrand Delanoe, the mayor of Paris, a city where Jewish voters still balance the Neo-French, remained silent throughout the Gaza War. So did Segolene Royal, Aubry’s arch-rival, who had taken in 2007, as a Socialist contender in the presidential election against Sarkozy, a fiercely pro-Israel and anti-Iran stand.
On the Right, President Sarkozy characterized the Israeli military operations against Hamas, on their very onset, as « disproportionate ». Upon his subsequent visits to the Middle East, while insisting on Israel’s right to security, he never questioned the validity of the Hamas rule in Gaza. On March 2, he cancelled the speech he had agreed to deliver at the annual dinner of Crif, the Representative Council of the French Jewish Organizations, as he had done the previous year ; he just dropped by a few minutes before the dinner, and then left. François Fillon, the prime minister, pronounced his own speech instead. While sticking in principle to the president’s doctrine on the Middle Eastern issues, he did his very best to appear as a friend of Israel and the Jewish people. According to various sources, former president Jacques Chirac was "appalled by the Gaza War", i. e. opposed Israel, once again, on a vital issue. There is evidence that the Gaullist faithfull among the conservatives share that view.
The Far Right was split. Le Pen’s diehard followers supported Hamas. As a matter of fact, the National Front leader had attended on December 26, the day before the Gaza War started, a show by Dieudonné Mbala Mbala, a Black antisemitic and anti-Israel activist, where a special award was bestowed on Robert Faurisson, the most famous Holocaust denier in France. The show took place at the Zenith theater, with an attendance of 5,000, half European, half Neo-French.
The more traditional Far Right (which has been deserting the National Front over the recent years) was unwilling to side with Hamas. They apparently drew a parallel between the Middle East and many French or European problems, or were concerned by the street violence. Some of the Far Righters even expressed explicit support for Israel.
The media reacted in very diverse ways to the Gaza War. Some of them, including State-run television channels like France 2, were rabidly anti-Israel. Nouvel Observateur, the flagship of the fashionable Left, devoted much space to the civilian losses among the Gaza Palestinians, much in line with Hamas propaganda. Many media were more balanced. The Left of Centre magazine L’Express published a strongly pro-Israel editorial by Christophe Barbier. Valeurs Actuelles, a conservative magazine, was largely supportive of Israel.
What remains to be seen is essentially whether the Neo-French will finally get frenchified and put individual freedom ahead of communal loyalties, or not. The prospects, so far, are not very satisfactory. Alternatively, one wonders whether a broad coalition of democrats can emerge and counterbalance those, either Neo-French or classic French, who sold their souls to the totalitarians. Two years ago, Sarkozy was seen as the nation’s best hope in this regard. This is no longer true today. Even if Sarkozy remains more decent than many other political leaders in the country.
© Michel Gurfinkiel & The Middle East Review for International Affairs, 2009
This article was published as part of a MERIA Forum. For further reading please go to :
http://www.gloria-center.org/